




Product Liability Law in the Federal Arena
Sherman Joyce*
INTRODUCTION
The law of product liability has been created by state judges' and
legislatures.' Although not widely noticed, this tradition changed
when Congress enacted the General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994.' That legislation established an eighteen-year statute of repose
for claims brought by non-commercial passengers injured or killed in
accidents involving light aircraft.4  Until that time, product liability
* Sherman Joyce is President of the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), a national
coalition of 400 non-profits, professional societies, trade associations, and corporations working
through in-state coalitions to bring fairness and efficiency to the tort system. Mr. Joyce is a
graduate of Princeton University and Catholic University Law School. From 1989 to 1994, he
served as minority counsel to the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee,
Science, and Transportation. In that capacity, he was the lead Republican staff member on
legislation to establish uniform rules for product liability law.
1. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962)
(establishing strict liability in tort).
2. Mississippi and Texas enacted product liability reform legislation in 1993. MIss. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001 -.006 (West Supp.
1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 1996)).
Congress has also enacted tort legislation governing injuries to workers on interstate railroads and
longshore and harbor workers. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (West
1986 & Supp. 1996); Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-
950 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
4. The relevant provisions of the statute are as follows:
Sec. 2 Time limitations on civil actions against aircraft manufacturers.
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law had been exclusively a function of state law. Nevertheless, product
liability reform legislation has been the subject of extensive examina-
tion and scrutiny by Members of the United States Congress for one
and a half decades.
The first widely noticed effort by the United States Senate to
enact federal product liability legislation occurred in 1981 when former
Senator Robert Kasten of Wisconsin introduced a bill in the 97th
Congress.' Since that time, the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation has reported legislation during each
successive Congress with the exception of the 100th in 1987-88. Prior
to this, the 104th Congress, no legislation has been considered on the
merits by the full Senate. Past consideration has been limited to
procedural votes to halt filibusters, and, until 1995, no effort has
succeeded. During this Congress, however, under the leadership of
Senators John D. Rockefeller, IV, of West Virginia, Slade Gorton of
Washington, and Joseph Lieberman and Christopher Dodd of
Connecticut, the Senate moved very quickly to pass S. 565, the Product
Liability Fairness Act of 1995.6 On May 10, 1995, the bill passed the
full Senate by a vote of 61 to 37.7
With the exception of the 100th Congress, the House of Repre-
sentatives has given product liability reform legislation even less
attention.8 The Chairmen of the House Judiciary Committee from
1980 until 1994, Peter Rodino and Jack Brooks, refused to hold even
(a) In General.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages
for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident
involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other
part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee, if
delivered directly from the manufacturer, or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the
business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or ....
Sec. 3 Other definitions.
For Purposes of this Act-
.... (3) the term "limitation period" means 18 years with respect to general
aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and other parts
of such aircraft; and ....
49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 1996).
5. S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1995).
6. See S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. S6,407-12 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
7. 141 CONG. REC. S6,369, S6,407 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
8. In 1988, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce reported an extensive product
liability bill by a bipartisan vote of 30 to 12. See H.R. REP. No. 748, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
1, at 26 (1988).
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one day of hearings on the subject. The 1995 change in leadership,
however, brought a dramatic change. The Republican leadership,
including Speaker Newt Gingrich of Georgia, Majority Leader Richard
Armey of Texas, Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde of
Illinois, Commerce Committee Chairman Thomas Bliley of Virginia,
Representative Christopher Cox of California, and many others, led the
successful effort to pass H.R. 956, the Common Sense Legal Standards
Reform Act of 1995, by a vote of 265 to 161.' Even more extraordi-
nary than the fact that the House successfully passed legislation for the
first time is the speed at which this was done: the vote on final
passage occurred on March 10, 1995, only seventy-two days after its
January 4th introduction.
On March 14, 1996, a House-Senate Conference Committee filed
the Conference Report on H.R. 956, a compromise measure that
resolved the differences between the two versions of the legislation.' 0
The Senate passed the Conference Report on March 21, 1996, by a
vote of 59 to 40." On March 29th, the House passed the measure
by a vote of 259 to 158.12
Prior to congressional consideration of the Conference Report, the
Clinton Administration indicated that the President would veto the bill
in its current form. 3 In a March 16th letter from the President to
Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Dole, the President stated that
H.R. 956 "represents an unwarranted intrusion on state authority....
Tort law is traditionally the prerogative of the states, rather than
Congress. In this bill, Congress has intruded on state power....
Those who advocated federal product liability reform were pleased
that they had established an extensive record on which this legislation
could be based.S Nevertheless, opponents of the legislation, includ-
ing the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and some professional
consumer organizations, such as Public Citizen, Consumers Union, and
9. 141 CONG. REC. H3,015, H3,027 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995).
10. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1996).
11. 142 CONG. REC. S2,553, S2,590 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996).
12. 142 CONG. REC. H3,176, H3,204 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996).
13. President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Product Liability Legislation, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 514 (Mar. 16, 1996).
14. Id. On May 2, the President carried through on this statement and vetoed the bill.
15. The American Tort Reform Association, along with other organizations that advocate
legal reform, supported passage of the broadest possible legislation that can be signed into law.
H.R. 956, as it passed the House, contains provisions on punitive damages, joint liability, and
health care liability that are outside product liability. This analysis will focus only on the law of
product liability as that is the topic for this forum, and because the Conference Report on H.R.
956 is limited to provisions on product liability. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1996).
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the Consumer Federation of America, continued to suggest that
Congress should not-indeed some have stated cannot--enact
legislation in this area, contending that Congress lacks power under the
Constitution to do so.
This Article will analyze the constitutional underpinnings for
federal product liability reform legislation and explain why Congress
has the authority under both the Commerce Clause and the Due
Process Clause to pass federal product liability legislation. It also will
explain briefly why federal legislators, who otherwise favor returning
power to the individual states, were justified in supporting federal
legislation.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. A Brief History
The Commerce Clause 6 has been the basis for enactment of a
sweeping array of federal legislation. As Chief Justice Marshall stated,
the Commerce power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution.' 1 7 Despite the seemingly unlimited authority that
this clause confers on the Congress, an analysis of key cases demon-
strates that the history of this provision is somewhat uneven.
In the early part of this century, the Supreme Court granted
Congress a great deal of latitude to legislate under the Commerce
Clause. For example, in Houston, E. & W Texas Railway Co. v.
United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 8 the Court held that when
aspects of intrastate activities and interstate activities were so closely
related as to require regulation of both in order to fully regulate
interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause permitted such a regulatory
process. "
Despite this expansive interpretation of Congress' power, just over
two decades later, the Court appeared to reverse course. In A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2" the Court ruled that
16. The Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power To ... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
18. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
19. Id. at 351-52.
20. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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regulation of the wages and hours worked by employees in a business
engaged in interstate activities was not permissible because the matters
subject to regulation were only indirectly related to interstate com-
merce.2' By limiting the reach of Congress' authority to only those
activities that directly affected interstate commerce, the Court sought
to avoid the obvious concern that "there would be virtually no limit to
the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a
completely centralized government. '1 2
After constricting Congress' power in Schecter Poultry, the
Supreme Court reversed course again and embarked on the path to the
current expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,23 the Court abandoned the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce by
upholding the National Labor Relations Act.24 The Court held that
regulation of intrastate activities would be upheld provided the
activities "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions. "25
This trend continued with Wickard v. Filburn,26 in which the
Court held that Congress could regulate purely local activities that
exert "a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' ' 27  The Court indicated
further that there would be no return to the narrow holding in Schecter
Poultry: "[b]roader interpretations of the Commerce Clause [were]
destined to supersede the earlier ones ... ."21 Since Wickard, the
Court has never looked back to its restrictive past. Instead, until
United States v. Lopez,29 which was decided last year, the Court has
granted Congress the unlimited latitude that Chief Justice Marshall
described in Gibbons v. Ogden.30
21. Id. at 548-50.
22. Id. at 548.
23. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. See id. at 36-38.
25. Id. at 37; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (Commerce Clause
power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise
of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.").
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 122.
29. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
30. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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B. United States v. Lopez
Because of this expansive interpretation of Congress' power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause, Congress has been free to enact
legislation regulating business and the economy since Wickard without
fear of being overturned by the Supreme Court. During that time, the
Commerce Clause has provided the basis for enacting a wide variety
of legislation.3' The first indication in over fifty years that this may
no longer be the case, however, occurred on April 26, 1995, when the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Lopez, overturned a federal statute
prohibiting guns in the immediate vicinity of a school.32 Writing for
a five-to-four majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three broad
categories of activities that Congress may regulate under the Commerce
Clause: (1) the "use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2) the"instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; and (3) those "activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. '33  The majority agreed that the
underlying statute did not fall into any of these categories, concluding
that the respondent's activities were purely local and lacked any
discernible relationship to interstate commerce. 34
C. Product Liability Legislation and the Commerce
Clause After Lopez
Opponents of federal product liability legislation suggest that the
apparent change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence signaled by Lopez,
after over half a century of virtually unrestricted congressional power,
could doom such legislation as beyond Congress' authority, particularly
because the underlying area of law has been almost exclusively an issue
for state judges and legislatures. An analysis of key aspects of the
substance of product liability reform legislation and the rationale for its
enactment make clear, however, that this is an issue that Congress can,
and indeed should, address, notwithstanding the holding in Lopez.
31. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(upholding public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the
Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that racial
discrimination at restaurants that receive a substantial portion of their food from out of state has
a direct and adverse impact on interstate commerce).
32. 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
33. Id. at 1629-30.
34. See id. at 1634.
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1. Regulation of Economic Activities Will Be Upheld
One major distinction between product liability reform proposals
in the 104th Congress and the statute in question in Lopez is crucial
to the Commerce Clause analysis. Lopez involved a criminal stat-
ute.3" None of the major Commerce Clause cases prior to Lopez
involved a criminal statute. Instead, these prior cases all involved
potential burdens on economic activity and the issue of whether there
was a sufficient nexus between that activity and interstate commerce.
The majority in Lopez pointed out this distinction in concluding that
the statute did not meet the standards articulated by the Court.36
2. Product Liability is Closely Related to Interstate Commerce
The derivation of product liability, the nature of the United States
economy, and the underwriting process for product liability insurance
all demonstrate that product liability is closely related to interstate
commerce. Product liability is the term for the "liability of a
manufacturer, seller or other supplier of chattels, to one with whom he
is not in privity of contract, who suffers physical harm caused by the
chattel."37 Liability can arise out of the sale of a product. Selling or
distributing a product clearly falls within the first category that the
majority in Lopez indicated would authorize Congress to regulate under
the Commerce Clause.3" Indeed, both the House and the Senate bills
include provisions that address the liability of wholesalers and
retailers.39
Further, America competes in an economy that is both national
and global. According to the United States Department of Commerce,
over 70 percent of the goods manufactured in a state are shipped and
sold out of that state."g Thus, while state product liability law would
be applied by the courts in that state, the products manufactured in
35. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.A. § 9 2 2(q) (West Supp. 1996).
36. 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
37. JOHN WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 694 (9th ed. 1994).
38. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (stating that "Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of Interstate Commerce").
39. See S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104, 141 CONG. REC. S6,408 (daily ed. May 10,
1995); H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103, 141 CONG. REC. H2,915 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995).
40. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Pub. No. TC77-CS,
COMMODITY TRANSPORTATION SURVEY 1-7 (1981). A strong interstate commerce rationale
also supported the General Aviation Revitalization Act. This Act serves as a precedent for
broader public liability reform. Congress has enacted legislation regulating civil liability outside
of product liability as well. See supra note 3.
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that state would be subject to the terms of the modified state law less
than one time out of three. This supports the argument for federal
legislation, as the salutary benefits of state product liability reform,
while important, are somewhat limited because product liability is truly
a matter of interstate commerce.
The underwriting process for product liability insurance also
demonstrates that product liability is a matter of interstate commerce.
During the Ford and Carter Administrations, the Federal Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability determined that insurers establish
their rates on a national basis.4 Consequently, modifications of the
law in a given state will have little or no impact on insurance rates.
Underwriters recognize that the manufacture and distribution of
products is a matter of national significance and, therefore, of interstate
commerce.
3. State Officials Have Called on Congress to Act
The National Governors Association has passed several resolutions
in recent years urging Congress to enact uniform product liability
laws.42 In addition, the American Legislative Exchange Council, a
bipartisan coalition of more than 2,400 state legislators, supports
federal product liability reform legislation.43 Both organizations are
strong supporters of states' rights. Both agree, however, that the
problems with our product liability system are national in scope and
require national solutions.44
Not all state officials, however, support this view. The National
Conference of State Legislatures and the Conference of Chief Justices
both believe that any reform of product liability law should occur at
the state level.4" Neither, however, has argued that Congress lacks
the authority to act in this area. Rather, both groups have limited their
arguments to disagreements about federalism and potential difficulties
41. See Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues, 43 Fed.
Reg. 14,612, 14,614 (1978).
42. See S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1995). President Clinton was a
member of the National Governors Association prior to his election as President. While
Governor of Arkansas, he served on two task forces that drafted and approved resolutions
supporting enactment of federal product liability reform legislation.
43. Id. at 14.
44. See id.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 64, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 40-41 (1995); S. REP. No. 69,




in applying a federal statute in fifty different state courts.4 6 Such
arguments are intended to convince Congress not to act-not to state
that it cannot act. This leaves Congress to decide, based on its own
notion of federalism, whether intervention in this area, which has been
almost exclusively within the province of state legislators and judges,
is appropriate.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM: THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause plainly empowers Congress to act in the
area of product liability if it so chooses. There is, however, another
aspect of both the House and Senate bills that supports Congress'
intervention in this area. Both bills contain provisions specifying the
types of conduct that warrant the awarding of punitive damages, the
procedures to determine whether punitive damage awards are appropri-
ate, and the limits on punitive damages based on the harm suffered.47
In recent years, the constitutionality of punitive damages has been
the subject of nearly annual review by the United States Supreme
Court.4" Early cases hinted that the Due Process Clause places limits
on the size of punitive damage awards49 and that procedural due
process requires courts and legislatures to ensure that the rights of
defendants are adequately protected because punitive damages are
46. H.R. REP. No. 64, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 40-41 (1995); S. REP. NO. 69, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1995).
47. H.R. 956 establishes a limit on punitive damages based on a multiplier of three times
economic damages or $250,000, whichever is greater. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, 141
CONG. REC. H2,916 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995). S. 565 limits punitive damages to two times
compensatory losses (economic and noneconomic) or $250,000, whichever is greater. S. 565,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107, 141 CONG. REC. S6,409 (daily ed. May 10, 1995). The lesser of
the two figures would apply in cases involving smaller businesses. Id. The Conference Report
adopts the Senate approach. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 481, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 108, at 10
(1996).
These reforms are based on the recommendations of three prestigious organizations. See
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15 (1989)
(advocating a limit of two times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater);
SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE SECTION OF LITIG., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 6-11 (1986) (proposing to create a
rebuttable presumption that punitive damage awards in excess of three times compensatory
damages are excessive); REPORTERS' STUDY, AMERICAN LAW INST., 2 ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 258-59 (1991) (recommending enactment of a formula
based on compensatory damages with an alternative monetary limit).
48. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
49. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986); Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. at 276-77.
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quasi-criminal penalties."0 Therefore, greater protection is to be
afforded defendants in the area of punitive damage awards than in the
area of compensatory damages.
Although the Supreme Court has declined to explicitly specify
appropriate limits for punitive damages, the Court has suggested that
clearly excessive punitive damage awards are unconstitutional. In
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,5' the Court found that a
punitive damage award of approximately four times the amount of
compensatory damages was very close to what it would consider
excessive and, therefore, was "close to the line" of constitutional
impropriety.5 2 The Court restated its view that an excessive punitive
damage award would be unconstitutional in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.53 Despite its concern about potentially
excessive awards, the Court has declined to establish a test or formula
to ensure that punitive damage awards are appropriate in amount.
This leads one to conclude that the Court is "inviting" Congress to act
in this area.54
Until the Court's recent decision in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, no punitive damage award had been overturned by the
Supreme Court on the ground that it was so excessive that it violated
the Due Process Clause. In this case, the Alabama Supreme Court
upheld a punitive damage award of $2 million arising out of BMW's
nondisclosure of a partial repainting of the vehicle prior to its delivery
to the plaintiff as a new automobile.55 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court stated three bases for determining whether a punitive
damage award is so excessive as to violate the Constitution: the
reprehensibility of the underlying conduct; whether there is a reason-
able relation between the harm suffered and the punitive damage
award; and the difference between the punitive damage award and
50. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
52. Id. at 23-24.
53. See 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
overturned a punitive damage award on the ground that it was excessive. Former Justice Byron
White wrote the opinion and stated that he was adhering to precedent by ruling that a punitive
damage award 250,000 times higher than actual damages is excessive. See Pulla v. Amoco Oil
Co., 72 F.3d 648 (1995).
54. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3390 (U.S. 1996).
55. 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994) (holding that a remittitur of the $4 million jury verdict
was appropriate and that a $2 million award was constitutionally reasonable), rev'd, 1996 U.S.
LEXIS 3390 (U.S. 1996).
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other civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed for similar
wrongdoing. 16
The Court once again declined to establish a bright-line test for
the constitutionality of punitive damage awards. Nevertheless, there
can be no doubt that addressing the constitutional issues presented in
this line of cases, with BMW of North America providing the clearest
statement about the limits imposed by the Constitution on punitive
damage awards, provides a sound basis upon which Congress can
legislate in the area of product liability law.
With respect to procedural due process, the Court found in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg"7 that Oregon's prohibition of judicial review of
punitive damage awards violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The House and Senate bills specify key
procedural reforms (e.g., bifurcation of trials, a standard of proof by
clear and convincing evidence); and because the Conference Report
retains these reforms, 9 it ensures that procedural fairness for defen-
dants in proceedings involving punitive damages is enhanced.
CONCLUSION
Congress plainly has the authority to legislate in the field of
product liability law. In the Lopez dissent, four justices voted in favor
of upholding the criminal statute that was overturned by the majori-
ty.6' Thus, the dissent would uphold virtually any federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause. While the majority does not subscribe
to this interpretation of the Commerce Clause, when faced with the
issue of Congress' authority to regulate this area, the majority would
recognize that product liability law is inextricably intertwined with
matters that are fundamental to interstate commerce: the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of products. Thus, the case for the constitution-
ality of national legislation in this area is overwhelming based on the
Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the holding in Lopez. Moreover,
one of the core issues of federal legislation, punitive damage reform,
strengthens the case for constitutionality because the Supreme Court
has stated that excessive punitive damages violate the Due Process
Clause. That alone is sufficient reason for Congress to legislate.
56. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3390, at *27.
57. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
58. Id. at 2341.
59. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 481, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 108, at 10-12 (1996).
60. 115 S. Ct. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The real issue for Congress is not whether it can act in this area.
Rather, the issue is whether it will. After well over a decade that saw
activity in this area confined to only one house of the Congress during
a particular Congress, in 1995, both houses of the United States
Congress acted promptly, recognizing that federal product liability
legislation is essential to enhancing the competitiveness of American
business, encouraging product innovation, and reducing the time and
expense needed to adjudicate disputes. These objectives will be
accomplished only through greater uniformity, predictability, and
fairness in the law of product liability.
Congress has acted in an environment in which the overwhelming
trend is to return power to the states. In this area of the law, however,
Congress has determined that certain problems with product liability
law must be addressed on a national basis, and, therefore, is bucking
the trend to return matters to the states. Passage of federal legislation
will do little to disturb state primacy in this area of the law. Rather,
federal legislation will enhance uniformity in key areas of the law,
leaving the majority of issues to be addressed by state courts and state
legislators.
Underlying Congress' action is a clear mandate to act: there can
be little dispute that the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause
empower Congress to legislate. In choosing to exercise that authority,
Congress has made the correct decision to enact balanced remedies to
very real problems in the law of product liability.
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